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I. Introduction
Until just a few years ago, vocal criticism of the American criminal justice system
focused almost entirely on the death penalty. The U.S. stood out, and still does, as nearly the
only developed country in the world with capital punishment, and for this it has been subject to
sharp criticism both internally and internationally. The death penalty is still a target of criticism,
but it may well be on its way out. In addition to the view that it is inherently wrong or barbaric—
or, if not inherently wrong, then wrong or barbaric in an advanced society like the United
States—at least three objections have become familiar. One is the death penalty’s enormous
costs compared even to a sentence of life imprisonment—a seemingly counterintuitive fact
resulting from the very high legal costs associated with the lengthy and mandatory appeals
process in death penalty cases. 1 Another has to do with the glaring racial and socioeconomic
disparities in how the death penalty is and has been applied. Finally, there is the increasing
difficulty of carrying out executions humanely as pharmaceutical companies who provide the
drugs used for the most commonly used method, lethal injection, have become wary of ethical
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1
See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Costs of the Death Penalty, at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/costsdeath-penalty.

missteps or bad publicity. For these and perhaps other reasons, both executions and support for
the death penalty have fallen in 2016 to levels lower than they have been in decades. 2
If the death penalty disappears, and even if it doesn’t, the time has come to closely
examine other harsh punishments in use in our system. Here I consider what is generally
considered the next harshest punishment: life in prison without the possibility of parole
(LWOP).3
In section II I explain why the time is ripe to evaluate the legitimacy of life sentences.
Section III explores the relationship between LWOP and the death penalty, which helps to
explain why LWOP has received insufficient scrutiny. In section IV I examine the main
arguments for punishment and conclude that only retribution can plausibly ground LWOP. In
sections V and VI I examine various understandings of retributivism and conclude that no
plausible interpretation entails or even necessarily recommends LWOP. Sections VII offers three
positive arguments for the abolition of LWOP. Section VIII summarizes my conclusions.

II. Why we should reexamine the legitimacy of life without parole sentences
Close examination of life without parole sentences is overdue for a variety of reasons,
familiar to many who study these issues but nonetheless worth reviewing.
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Richard Perez-Pena, Executions Hit 25-Year-Low and Support Is Falling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2016,
athttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/death-penalty-capital-punishment.html?_r=0; and Death Penalty
Information Center, The Death Penalty in 2016: Year-End Report, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2016. On the pharmaceutical issues see, e.g., the inaugural episode, Cruel
and Unusual, of the NPR podcast series MORE PERFECT, June 2, 2016, at
http://www.npr.org/podcasts/481105292/more-perfect.
3
I say “generally considered” because some view life without parole as just as harsh or even harsher than the death
penalty; more on this subject below.
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A. Explosion of LWOP sentences
One is the explosion of these sentences in the last few decades. As of 2012, 49,081
people were serving LWOP sentences.4 Between 2008 and 2012 LWOP sentences increased by
22.2 percent; they have quadrupled since 1984.5 In six states and the federal system all life
sentences are LWOP.6 In 2012, over 3200 people were serving LWOP sentences for nonviolent
drug and property offenses. 7 According to the ACLU, “no one sentenced to life without parole
has ever been released on parole.”8
Meanwhile, from 1984 to 2012 the US population increased only 33 percent, from about
236 to 314 million.

B. Explosion of life with parole sentences
Life sentences—with the possibility of parole—have also quadrupled since 1984. As of
2009, almost 100,000 people were serving life sentences with parole. 9 (Those serving life
sentences, with and without parole, constitute 9.5 percent of all prisoners.) “In eight jurisdictions
for which data are available since the 1980s, average time served by lifers with murder

4

Ashley Nellis, Life Goes On: The Historic Rise in Life Sentences in America, The Sentencing Project (2013), at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Unlocking-Justice-Historic-Rise-in-Life-SentencesWebinar.pdf. These sentences are sometimes called “natural life sentences”; in the UK they go by the name “whole
life sentences.”
5
Nellis, Life Goes On, supra note 4, at 13.
6
ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 9 (The
Sentencing Project, July 2009), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/no-exit-the-expanding-use-of-lifesentences-in-america/.
7
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NONVIOLENT OFFENSES 2
(2013), at https://www.aclu.org/report/living-death-life-without-parole-nonviolent-offenses.
8
ACLU Northern California, The Truth About Life Without Parole: Condemned to Die in Prison, at
https://www.aclunc.org/article/truth-about-life-without-parole-condemned-die-prison.
9
NELLIS & KING, NO EXIT, supra note 6, at 3, 6.
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convictions nearly doubled from 11.6 years for those paroled in the 1980s to 23.2 years for those
paroled between 2000 and 2013.”10
In 26 states, parole boards have almost unlimited power to make decisions; often
operating behind closed doors, their decisions are largely unreviewable. 11 The average state
parole board considers 8,355 inmates for release a year—35 decisions a day—and has other
responsibilities. In 44 states, the board is wholly appointed by the governor; these remunerative
positions can be rewards for former aides and allies. 12
Lifers in Tennessee must serve 51 years before they become eligible for parole. 13 In
California, the parole board recommends parole 2 to 5 percent of the time; its recommendations
are often rejected by the governor’s office. 14 In Maryland, almost 10 percent of prisoners are
serving life sentences with parole; not a single one was released between 1996 and 2014. 15
Releasing prisoners is politically risky, as we saw in the 1988 presidential election when it
emerged that Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis had released convicted felon “Willie”
Horton on a weekend furlough program. Horton did not return to prison and was later convicted
of violent crimes, including rape, committed after his escape. Some attribute Dukakis’s defeat in
the election to the Horton ad run by the George H.W. Bush campaign. 16 Politicians learned a
lesson.

10

NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, DELAYING A SECOND CHANCE: THE DECLINING PROSPECTS FOR PAROLE ON LIFE
SENTENCES (The Sentencing Project, Jan. 31, 2017), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/delayingsecond-chance-declining-prospects-parole-life-sentences/#II.%20Key%20Findings.
11
Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole 3 The Marshall Project (July 10, 2015), at
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/10/life-without-parole.
12
Id. at 8, 4.
13
Jessica S. Henry, Death-in-Prison Sentences: Overutilized and Underscrutinized, in CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. &
AUSTIN SARAT, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 69 (2012).
14
Id.
15
GHANDNOOSH, supra note 10, at 26.
16
For a good account and a recent interview with Horton see Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton
Revisited, The Marshall Project (May 13, 2015), at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-hortonrevisited#.LQhugD6MV. William Horton (who was not called Willie until Lee Atwater, who ran Bush’s campaign,
so named him) is incarcerated today at Jessup Correctional Institution in Maryland and maintains his innocence.
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In short, life with parole is often de facto life without parole.

C. Supreme Court restrictions on severe sentences, especially for juveniles
At the same time, for the last decade or so the Supreme Court has been imposing
restrictions on the death penalty and on life without parole sentences, at least for juveniles. Roper
v. Simmons (2005) struck down the death penalty for juveniles. Graham v. Florida (2010)
invalidated LWOP for juveniles not convicted of homicide. And in 2012, in a joint ruling
deciding Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, the Court announced that mandatory LWOP
sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional. This ruling alone affected 2500 prisoners—not
surprising when we consider that adolescence is prime time for criminal activity. 17

D. Comparison with other countries
Another reason to reevaluate LWOP policies is the enormous disparity in sentencing
practices between the United States and other developed countries. Norway is best known—in
some circles notorious—for capping the maximum sentence for any crime to 21 years. That
includes Anders Breivik, convicted for the murder of 69 young people and eight others at a
Workers’ Youth League summer camp in 2011.18

As Dukakis puts it in an interview reported in this article, “The easy thing to do is never to commute anybody,
never parole anybody. And unfortunately, in my judgment, that’s happening more and more.” Id.
17
See Joshua Ravner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, The Sentencing Project (July 1, 2016), at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/. The Roper decision affected 72
prisoners, the Graham decision 123.
18
That doesn’t mean Breivik will be freed after 21 years. “Judges will be able to sentence him to an unlimited
number of five-year extensions if he is still deemed a risk to the public.” Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit
Crime?, The Marshall Project, (March 20, 2015), at https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-tocommit-crime#.jVkAeF0cA. Recently Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project recommended a 20-year maximum on
federal criminal sentences. Marc Mauer, A Proposal to Reduce Time Served in Federal Prison, Testimony to Charles
Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections (March 11, 2015), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/aproposal-to-reduce-time-served-in-federal-prison/.
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Germany outlawed LWOP in 1977. The Federal Constitutional Court argued that
“rehabilitation is constitutionally required in any community that establishes human dignity as its
centerpiece”—which the German constitution does. Thus, “a humane enforcement of life
imprisonment is possible only when the prisoner is given a concrete and realistically attainable
chance to regain his freedom. . . .”19 In 2013 the European Court of Human Rights decided that
LWOP violated Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits
“inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 20
These disparities do not show that the Europeans are right and the Americans wrong. But
they are enough to make a reflective person think.

III. LWOP and the death penalty
LWOP invites scrutiny in part because of its intimate relationship with the death penalty.
It’s almost impossible to think through the former without making comparisons with the latter.
“Life without parole has been absolutely crucial to whatever progress has been made against the

19

Life Imprisonment Case (1977), 45 BVerGE 187 [in The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of
Germany 308-09 (Donald P. Kommers ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1997).] Article 1.1 of the German constitution (the
"Basic Law") states that “human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state
authority.” Article 2.1 states: “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”
20
Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III-Eur. Ct. H.R 317 (Grand Chamber)(July 9, 2013): “…in the context of a life
sentence, Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of a review which
allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such
progress toward rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can
no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds,” §119. On January 17, 2017, however, the Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights announced that the whole life sentence of a UK prisoner, brought before the
ECtHR in Hutchinson v. UK, Appl. no. 57592/08 (Jan. 17, 2017), does not violate Article 3—thereby reversing a
previous ruling. The change comes from the finding that the UK law complies with the ECHR standards on release
and review. “Specifically, U.K. law allows the Secretary of State to reduce a life sentence at any time on
compassionate grounds, which, the State claims, encompass more than end-of-life situations and will be interpreted
in line with the ECHR.” International Justice Resource Center, ECtHR: UK ‘Whole Life Sentences’ Now Compatible
with ECHR, Jan. 23, 2017, http://www.ijrcenter.org/2017/01/23/ecthr-u-k-whole-life-sentences-now-compatiblewithechr/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+InternationalJusticeResourceCente
r+%28International+Justice+Resource+Center%29).
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death penalty," according to James Liebman, Columbia Law professor and scholar of the death
penalty. “The drop in death sentences”—from 320 in 1996 to 125 in 2005—“would not have
happened without LWOP.”21 Why the connection? Death penalty opponents point to studies
showing that support for it drops drastically among jurors and the general public when LWOP is
an option.22 It stands to reason that people who fear that abolishing the death penalty means
letting dangerous criminals go free, or dispensing less punishment than they deserve, may be
reassured by life-without-parole sentences. Death penalty abolitionists have sometimes even
joined with “pro-incarceration activists and legislators” to pass LWOP statutes.23 From 1992 to
2003, the LWOP population grew more than five times faster than the group of prisoners on
death row: the former by 170 percent, the latter by 31 percent.24
Ironically, prisoners sentenced to LWOP are legally disadvantaged compared to those
sentenced to death, who have rights of appeal and review noncapital defendants don’t get. 25 As
Adam Liptak puts it, “The pro bono lawyers who work so aggressively to exonerate or spare the
lives of death row inmates are not interested in the cases of people merely serving life terms.” 26
Courts could not extend these kinds of protections to those serving LWOP sentences without
incurring staggering costs.27
One might mistakenly infer from the disparity in treatment that LWOP is not so bad. But
a different conclusion is that some have put “the death penalty” into a box that says

21

Quoted in Adam Liptak, No Way Out: Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2005,
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/us/serving-life-with-no-chance-of-redemption.html?_r=0.
22
Id. See also OGLETREE & SARAT, supra note 13, at 5.
23
Note: A Matter of Life and Death: the Effect of Life-without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 1838 (2006).
24
Id. at 1852.
25
“Unlike death sentences…life-without-parole sentences receive no special consideration from appellate tribunals”
Id. at 1853.
26
Liptak, supra note 21.
27
Rachel E. Barkow, Life Without Parole and the Hope for Real Sentencing Reform, in OGLETREE & SARAT, supra
note 13, at 207. Barkow provides a good analysis of the comparison between LWOP and the death penalty.
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“forbidden”—perhaps on deep-seated religious grounds that prohibit killing, even though as a
matter of fact few people regard the taking of life as in all cases impermissible. The consequence
has been to treat all non-corporal punishments as in a wholly different category, automatically
legitimate or at the very least not forbidden. But the deep justifications for abolition of the death
penalty have implications for other punishments such as life without parole.

IV. LWOP and the justifications for punishment
For all these reasons, then, it’s appropriate to look closely at LWOP and the justifications
that have been offered for it. It’s important first to clarify the scope of this argument. Some
LWOP sentences are excessive by any reasonable standard—including at least those serving
LWOP for nonviolent offenses. Without settling on what that standard is, I assume many people
who do not oppose LWOP in principle would agree. Since my argument against LWOP is an
argument of principle, we may exclude from consideration those many incarcerated people who
are subject to obviously excessive sentences.
A second group of those serving LWOP sentences should never be released. There are
two possible reasons that might be given for continuing to incarcerate them. One is that they are
too dangerous, and the other is that they are unrepentant or not rehabilitated.28 I address these
reasons in more detail below. But requiring someone to remain incarcerated for their whole life
is not the same as sentencing them at the time of conviction to LWOP. To oppose LWOP in
principle is to oppose sentencing a person at the time of conviction to life in prison without the

28

Many people too dangerous to be released may suffer from mental illness and belong not in prison but in a facility
where punishment per se is not the aim. Conditions in the latter can be awful too, of course—and people
incarcerated in such facilities may sometimes even prefer prison, where their sentences may have an end point. An
unforgettable illustration occurs in Frederick Wiseman’s 1967 documentary Titicut Follies, about patient-inmates in
a Massachusetts hospital for the criminally insane. One of the inmates begs to be transferred to prison, which the
staff take as further evidence for his lack of mental competence.

8

possibility of parole—it is to oppose making a final judgment at sentencing that no matter what a
person does, no matter how he changes, he will never be fit to rejoin society. It is not to say that
every person sentenced to a crime must eventually be released.
The traditional literature generally divides the justifications for punishment into four or
five kinds: general deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Philosophers in recent years have offered others aims of punishment that do not fit neatly into
these categories but sometimes overlap with them, such as moral education, communication, and
the expression of moral norms and values.29 In what follows I consider the standard justifications
and indicate where and how the latter ones fit with them.
The aim of general deterrence is to punish individuals who have committed crimes in
order to send a message to others who might be contemplating criminal acts that they too will
suffer punishment if they carry out their plans. Few would deny that general deterrence must and
does play some part in the legitimate rationales for punishment. If no penalties attached to
criminal behavior more people would commit crimes. (This claim is perfectly compatible with
the view that people refrain from committing crimes for other reasons besides the prospect of
punishment.) The question is which deterrents function to reduce the likelihood of committing
crimes, and how much.
Much recent work shows that it is the certainty of punishment rather than its severity that
deters would-be criminals. There are at least three reasons why severe punishments are less
effective than abstract consideration might lead one to expect. First, not all potential offenders

29

See also 18 U.S.C. 1853, according to which the sentence should “reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense; afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner” (numbers and
sections omitted).
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are deterrable, or not as deterrable as they might be. No one is purely rational; substance abuse
and mental illness make would-be offenders less so. It’s clear that many people fail to perform
cost-benefit calculations before breaking the law, or do so badly. Second, to be deterred by a
punishment one has to know what the punishment is; people tend to underestimate the severity of
penalties. Perhaps most important is that the many steps between crime and punishment—being
caught, accused, tried, convicted, sentenced—greatly reduce the likelihood of punishment. As
Valerie Wright puts it in a report for the Sentencing Project, “since most crimes, including
serious ones, do not result in an arrest and conviction, the overall deterrent effect of the certainty
of punishment is substantially reduced.” 30 For all these reasons, it’s extremely unlikely that
LWOP deters crime better than less harsh sentences.
What about specific deterrence? This term is sometimes used ambiguously. More
literally, it refers to the idea that a person who has been incarcerated will be deterred by the
negative experience from reoffending in order to avoid similar pain in the future. But specific
deterrence may be conflated with incapacitation: while a person is locked up she is less likely to
engage in antisocial or destructive behavior. By incarcerating offenders we decrease the chances
that they will harm others—not entirely, of course, since they may harm fellow prisoners or
prison employees, but largely.31
But both these purposes are contradicted by a variety of findings. One is that for some
kinds of crimes—drug trafficking especially—those sent to prison are quickly replaced by

30

VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL J USTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT,
(The Sentencing Project, November 2010), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/deterrence-in-criminaljustice-evaluating-certainty-vs-severity-of-punishment/. This report is also the source of other claims in this
paragraph. See also Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME AND J USTICE 176 (2013) for a
thorough review of the literature pointing to the ineffectiveness of severe penalties as general deterrents.
31
Some may think that since prisoners have done wrong and have forfeited some of their rights, the risks they bear
of harm by other incarcerated persons should trouble us less than risks borne by those on the outside.
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others.32 Moreover, almost all criminals, including violent ones, age out of crime before middle
age.”33 One study shows that those released from life sentences were “less than one-third as
likely as all released offenders to be rearrested within three years of release from prison.” 34 The
reason for this seemingly paradoxical finding may be at least partly that those released had
already served long sentences and were no longer young. In any case, from the point of view of
both specific deterrence and incapacitation, LWOP sentences make little sense.
Consider now rehabilitation. (Here I leave aside that, despite its appearance in 18 U.S.
§3553 of the criminal code, rehabilitation has not been an explicit aim of the U.S. criminal
justice system at least since Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
which proclaimed that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.”35) The concept of rehabilitation is also ambiguous. Does it mean simply
becoming a person who can live in society without risking injury to others, or does it include
some notion of repentance or change of heart? I shall return to this question, but for my purposes
here it doesn’t matter, except in the sense that the stronger meaning of rehabilitation
encompasses moral education, sometimes offered as a distinct justification for punishment.
Some prisoners no doubt become rehabilitated over years of incarceration, although it
may be hard to distinguish rehabilitation from aging out of crime. On the other hand, there is
good reason to believe that prison sometimes makes people worse rather than better. 36 Leaving

32

Tonry, supra note 30, at 181-3.
Goldstein, supra note 18. See also JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 193, 231 (2017).
34
MARC M AUER, RYAN S. KING & M ALCOLM C. YOUNG, THE M EANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON SENTENCES IN
CONTEXT 24 (The Sentencing Project, 2004), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-meaning-of-lifelong-prison-sentences-in-context/.
35
18 U.S.C. § 3582 and Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, U.S. House of Representatives,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/senate-bill/1762, and note 26 supra.
36
See, e.g., Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor-Market Impacts of Incarceration (unpublished 2014),
http://www.columbia.edu/~mgm2146/incar.pdf.
33
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these factors aside, it is hard to see how rehabilitation could be a purpose of life-without-parole
sentences, if, as seems clear, LWOP is neither necessary or useful in realizing that purpose. On
the contrary, it seems more likely that the prospect of eventual freedom would serve as an
incentive for an incarcerated person to change.37
What about punishment’s expressive function? We punish people partly to express
condemnation of their acts, respect for their victims, and commitment to the rule of law.38 To
perform these functions adequately—to take crime seriously and to repair the social and moral
fabric produced by it—requires not just any punishments but ones that “fit” the crimes.
An important question is whether or to what extent the fit and proportionality of
punishments are objectively given and to what extent they are culturally relative or socially
determined. Would a 21-year sentence for the unrepentant Dylann Roof, who killed nine
parishioners at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in
June 2015, express disrespect for his victims and the rule of law? This is the kind of sentence
Roof would get in Norway. It seems ludicrous to think that Norwegians do not value life to the
same degree that Americans do, and thus that their shorter sentences express or represent a
disrespect of humanity. And this seems in keeping with the idea that cultural variations in how
norms are expressed are compatible with an objectivist view of their significance. For example,
every culture has norms of civility and rudeness, but what constitutes civility and rudeness
differs from place to place. In some places, we are told, belching is good manners; not in ours.

37

See, e.g., Dan Bernhardt, Steve Mongrain, & Joann Roberts, Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of
Parole Decisions, 28 J. LAW & ECON. ORGANIZATION 186 (2012), arguing that rehabilitation correlates with
sentences that are neither too short nor too long. Presumably LWOP sentences are too long. See section VII for
discussion of how policies and expectations toward offenders can influence their behavior.
38
These functions might be thought separate and supportive of somewhat different rationales for punishment. I
collect them together, and think together they fulfill the expressive function. The expressive function is sometimes
understood to be a version of retributivism, although one might also view it as a close cousin of general deterrence.
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This example might be thought to tell against my point, not for it. Maybe shorter
sentences do not express disrespect for victims and the law in Norway, it might be argued; but
given American habits and customs, in the U.S. they would. But this claim wrongly suggests that
cultural practices and customs are immutable. Obviously changes in attitude do not happen
overnight. No doubt reforms need to occur gradually, not too far ahead of public sentiment and
partly spurred by it. That is likely to be the way sentencing practices would evolve in any case,
just as they have with the U.S. Supreme Court’s erosion of the death penalty and LWOP
sentences for juveniles.
The concept of a reasonable and appropriate minimum sentence is not completely
malleable. A hundred dollar fine for rape is too little; a 20-year prison sentence for shoplifting is
too much. But the concept is flexible enough to accommodate the abolition of LWOP without
expressing disrespect for victims or the rule of law.

V. Retributivism as the only possible ground for LWOP
I have argued that LWOP sentences cannot be justified in terms of general deterrence,
specific deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or expressivism. That leaves retributivism as
the ground on which their legitimacy must rest. Can this defense succeed? To decide will require
an extended discussion.
Here is a simple formulation of the retributivist view as it applies to LWOP:
1. Some people’s crimes are sufficiently heinous that they deserve LWOP.
2. People

ought to get the punishment they deserve.

The traditional and perhaps intuitive understanding of retributivism is lex talionis: the law
of retaliation, “an eye for an eye.” It’s not difficult to show that this interpretation is

13

unacceptable, for well-known reasons: it would allow or even require torturing torturers and
raping rapists, among other things. The alternative to lex talionis I will consider has been
described as proportional retributivism, the idea that we should punish people in proportion to
their crimes.39 On this view, we should construct an ordinal ranking of crimes and punishments
in which the worst crimes get the worst punishments, the next worst crimes get the next worst
punishments, etc. Of course, this is at best an ideal that can be achieved only roughly. And, as I
have just argued, the ranking should not be purely ordinal. If the worst punishment is too light it
will not take seriously the crimes it addresses.
The concept of proportional retributivism leaves open at least two important questions.
First, what is the range—from minimum to maximum—of morally acceptable and appropriate
punishments? I leave this question aside here, except to argue that LWOP lies beyond the
maximum.
Second, what is the deontic force of “ought” in “We ought to punish people in proportion
to their crimes”? Retributivism is not satisfied, I believe, by the minimal view that a certain
punishment is permitted—i.e. that guilt is a necessary condition for punishment. 40 To say a
person deserves punishment x is at least to recommend that the person suffer x. But this still
leaves much room for variation. Here are three possible interpretations:
(i) A should be punished other things being equal.
(ii) A should be punished unless some important countervailing reasons apply.
(iii) A should be punished no matter what.

39

See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 130, 119-21
(1985).
40
But some call this view “negative retributivism,” Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/), or “modest retributivism,” David Dolinko, Some
Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 542 (1991).
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Kant notably believed (iii). On his view, punishing wrongdoers is morally required:
whoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical substitute or
surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of justice. There is no likeness or
proportion between life, however painful, and death ….Even if a civil society resolved to
dissolve itself with the consent of all its members…the last murderer lying in prison
ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. 41
I shall assume a less absolute but still strong interpretation of retributivism: that wrongdoers
should get the punishment they deserve unless there are strong countervailing reasons why they
should not.

VI. Three possible responses to the retributivist argument
In this section I consider three possible responses to the retributivist argument for LWOP.
A. No wrongdoers deserve LWOP, because no wrongdoers deserve any punishment.
Although some people must be confined against their will because they pose a danger to society,
this is not punishment, i.e. the intentional infliction of suffering as a response to wrongdoing.
This view constitutes a wholesale rejection of retributivism.
B. Some wrongdoers deserve LWOP, but because it is inhumane, uncivilized, or
otherwise unacceptable we should not impose it and should impose a lesser punishment instead.
In this case, a lesser punishment than LWOP is justified not by the offender’s desert but by other
moral considerations.
V. No wrongdoers deserve LWOP, although they deserve some lesser punishment. A
lesser punishment than LWOP is justified by considerations of the offender’s desert.
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Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142
(Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1780).
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A. Should we reject retributivism?
Consider the view that no wrongdoers deserve LWOP because no one deserves any
punishment. It implies that even the suffering of a wrongdoer imposed as punishment is an
intrinsic evil that can be justified only as a means to some greater good. This is a view typically
associated with consequentialism, although one can hold it without being a consequentialist.
Evaluating this view is not easy, in part because it’s hard to isolate the nature and purpose
of suffering a wrongdoer might undergo while being punished. Suppose you believe that an
essential aim of punishment is rehabilitation, including moral education. You might well think
that suffering is required for moral education to take place—that no one could be rehabilitated in
the desired sense unless they suffered, at some point at least, in recognition of the wrongs they
had committed. In that case the wrongdoer’s suffering would be a necessary element in
punishment. But it would not be intrinsically desirable in the way a retributivist believes it is;
suffering would rather be an empirically necessary precondition for rehabilitation. We can test
our intuitions about this matter by imagining a person who by taking a pill not only becomes
harmless but genuinely appreciates the immorality of his criminal acts. Yet his understanding is
intellectual, not emotional, and so he does not suffer as a result—for that is how the pill works.42
Is this enough? If you think not, then it appears you believe suffering is an intrinsic and not
simply an instrumental good.
The problem is that it’s difficult to imagine how someone could recognize the wrongness
of what they had done intellectually without at the same time suffering in so recognizing it; if
they didn’t suffer, we would have good reason to doubt that genuine recognition had taken place.

The anti-retributivist Victor Tadros argues that it is the wrongdoer’s recognition of wrongdoing, rather than his
suffering, that we should aim to bring about. See TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW (2011), chapters 3 and 4.
42
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In that case, suffering, although not intrinsically good, would be an essential part of coming to
believe you have done wrong.
In any case, it is best not to rest the argument against LWOP on a wholesale rejection of
retributivism, because retributivism and anti-retributivism seem to be foundational positions
impossible to establish or disestablish. One is reminded of the philosopher John Wisdom’s
discussion, in his classic paper “Gods,” of the two people who “return to their long neglected
garden and find among the weeds a few of the old plants surprisingly vigorous.” 43 One sees
evidence of order and the work of a gardener, the other of disorder and neglect. After further
examination, research, and discussion, neither’s view has changed. At this point, Wisdom argues,
when one says
‘I still think a gardener comes’ and the other says ‘I don’t,’ their different words now
reflect no difference as to what they have found in the garden, no difference as to what
they would find in the garden if they looked further and no difference about how fast
untended gardens fall into disorder.44
Of course this is just a way of saying that their disagreement is not empirical, and no one will be
surprised to learn that the differences between retributivists and nonretributivists do not rest
primarily on disagreements about the facts. But Wisdom’s metaphor is salient. Consider two
people responding to the crimes and trial of Dylann Roof. Roof has shown no remorse for the
murders; in a white supremacist manifesto he wrote in prison, he said: “I would like to make it
crystal clear I do not regret what I did. I am not sorry. I have not shed a tear for the innocent
people I killed.”45 The jury found him guilty and in January 2017 he was sentenced to death.

John Wisdom, Gods, 45 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 185, 191 (1944-45).
Id. at 192.
45
Alan Blinder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof, Addressing Court, Offers No Apology or Explanation for Massacre,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/us/dylann-roof43
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To many people Roof personifies evil. He killed nine innocent people; they were in a
church, at a Bible study meeting; he had spent time with them and talked with them; his acts
were motivated by racial hatred; they were premeditated; he showed no remorse. He appears to
be the poster child for the harshest punishment our system permits. (Probably the only thing that
can be said in his favor is that he neither denies nor make excuses for having intentionally
carried out these acts.)
Others, however—although no less appalled by Roof’s actions—may see him differently.
He’s pathetic, to be pitied rather than hated. We would not want to be him. We do not think of
him as someone who has taken advantage of the rules to do what others would do if they were
less fair-minded.46 Without endorsing a simple view of criminality as disease in need of
treatment rather than punishment, it can be hard to avoid the thought that his soul is disordered
(even if you are not in the habit of talking about people’s souls). We may call this a Platonic
conception of crime and punishment, even if we are not prepared to follow Plato all the way to
the conclusion that wrongdoing is simply (or not so simply) a form of ignorance. But we might
agree with Plato that we should never harm any person, even if they have harmed us.47 To those
drawn to this perspective, punishment of someone like Dylann Roof may seem beside the point.
Let me consider three responses that might be made to this way of contrasting the two
pictures.

sentencing.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=
article&_r=0.
46
This is the argument for punishment from fair play, usually considered a retributivist argument, according to
which the wrongdoer has taken advantage of the system and therefore should be punished. This argument is
implausible when it comes to violent crime, although it makes sense in some realms, such as paying one’s taxes.
Jean Hampton notes the limits of the fair play argument in Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 114-16 (1988)..
47
“It is never just to harm anyone,” Socrates says in the Republic (335a-f) after an exchange in which Polemarchus
asserts it is just to treat one’s friends well and to harm one’s enemies. PLATO’S REPUBLIC 10-11 (G.M.A. Grube
trans., 1992).
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First, one might argue that as such they are not truly incompatible. Those who regard
some violent wrongdoers as personifying evil may agree that their souls are disordered. But there
is an essential difference between one who adopts the first picture and one who adopts the
second. It lies in the attitude they take toward the wrongdoer, more specifically whether they
think it is intrinsically good that the wrongdoer suffer or not. This is of course precisely the
disagreement between retributivists and their opponents. I do think it is well-illustrated by the
two pictures I have sketched. The retributivist does not think the wrongdoer is pitiable or pathetic
insofar as that implies we should not cause him suffering for its own sake.
Second, one might argue that even if the picture of wrongdoers as pitiable rather than evil
fits people like Roof, it is inadequate to the Hitlers and Stalins of the world. Is that because of the
magnitude of their evil deeds?—that Hitler and Stalin committed heinous crimes against millions
of people continually, as adults, while Roof committed a crime on one day, in his youth?
Certainly some people will want to distinguish wrongdoers along these lines and reserve their
strongest retributive impulses only for the worst of the worst, perhaps leaving the Roofs of the
world in a lesser circle of hell. But the question is whether anyone belongs in the first group.
These two objections reinforce Wisdom’s view that the disagreement we encounter here
is close to bedrock, representing attitudes toward those who have committed horrible crimes that
are highly resistant to changes of mind or heart. Two people may look at the same set of facts
and have radically different moral responses that cannot be rationally adjudicated.
Finally, the idea that the wrongdoer is pitiable or pathetic might not seem to fit with the
conception of human dignity on which the European Court of Human Rights rests its rejection of
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the death penalty and LWOP.48 Perhaps “pitiable” and “pathetic” are not the right terms;
nevertheless, dignity is not what comes to mind.
There is much controversy about the meaning and role of the concept of dignity in
discussions of human rights—with some asserting that it’s “nothing but a phrase.”49 For my
purposes here it is perhaps enough to note that in these contexts (and no doubt others) dignity is a
normative rather than a descriptive concept. It tells us that we ought to treat people a certain way,
not that they are a certain way. We should treat people with dignity, but that doesn’t mean they
always behave with dignity.

B. Overriding retributivism
So resting the argument against LWOP on a wholesale rejection of retributivism would
fail to touch many seemingly reasonable people with some retributive ground-beliefs. Consider
next the argument that some wrongdoers deserve LWOP, but because it is inhumane, uncivilized,
or otherwise unacceptable we should not impose it. This is Jeffrey Reiman’s reason for rejecting
the death penalty. According to Reiman, “Publicly refusing to do horrible things to our
fellows…signals the level of our civilization and…continues the work of civilizing.”50 The death
penalty is horrible, he believes, because of the intense pain (psychological if not physical)
accompanying it and “the spectacle of one human being completely subject to the power of
another.”51 Unless the death penalty has significant marginal deterrent value (which Reiman

See Vinter, supra note 20, at §113: “…it would be incompatible with the provision on human dignity in the Basic
Law for the State forcefully to deprive a person of his freedom without at least providing him with the chance to
someday regain that freedom.”
49
See Charles R. Beitz, Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a Phrase?, 41 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. Philosophy & Public Affairs 259 (2013).
50
Reiman, supra note 39, at 136. Emphasis in original. And “from the fact that something is justly deserved, it does
not automatically follow that it should be done, since there may be other moral reasons for not doing it such that, all
told, the weight of moral reasons swings the balance against proceeding” Id. at 134.
51
Id. at 140.
48
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doubts, for good reason), it lies beyond the realm of acceptable punishments. 52 Reiman thus
rejects Kant’s claim that a wrongdoer’s desert is the only consideration relevant to deciding their
punishment.
The concession that some wrongdoers deserve to die makes Reiman’s argument highly
attractive in certain ways. It allows one to reject the death penalty without seeming to soft-pedal
criminal acts. But can Reiman’s approach delegitimize the death penalty without doing the same
for LWOP? Does locking someone up for the rest of his life with no prospect of release cause
less intense psychological pain than killing him? The six Alabama defendants charged with
capital crimes who chose death over LWOP clearly thought not.53 And they are not alone.
Indeed, it’s not obvious that Reiman’s approach even clearly delegitimizes the death
penalty. It might be wrong to torture the torturer and rape the rapist but still acceptable to kill the
killer. So in the end the strategy of claiming a punishment to be “deserved, but uncivilized” may
not be helpful in deciding whether sentences such as death and LWOP are morally permissible; it
might seem to beg the question.
For similar reasons, the considerations suggesting that a punishment is deserved but
uncivilized might equally warrant the conclusion that it is in fact undeserved. Indeed, it becomes
hard to tell the difference between these claims. That brings us to the third response to the
retributivist argument for LWOP: that wrongdoers deserve to be punished, but not with LWOP.
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Id. at 138. Emphasis in original.
According to Bryan Stevenson, director of the Equal Justice Initiative, discussed in Liptak, supra note 21. It’s also
true, however, that most people on death row fight hard to get their sentences converted to life. But it’s unclear
whether that’s because they prefer living a long life in prison to death or because a life sentence still leaves the door
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C. A moderate retributivism
I have argued that of the standard justifications for punishment, only retributivism can
hope to justify LWOP. But without the implausible assumption that retributivism requires
punishment equal or proportional to the crime, irrespective of any other considerations,
retributivism neither entails nor even suggests that some people should remain in prison for life.
So the link between retributivism and LWOP is severable and contingent: justice does not
require LWOP. In the remainder of this paper I hope to show why even retributivists should
reject it.
Proponents of LWOP believe some offenders should never be released from prison no
matter what they do or how they change. Two kinds of change are significant. One is the change
from being dangerous to being not dangerous. Nonretributivists think that when the (forwardlooking) justifications for punishment are not met offenders should be released. If we agree that
LWOP does not serve the purposes of general deterrence or rehabilitation, in practice this means
that offenders who are no longer dangerous should be released.54
It might be said that any risk, no matter how small, posed by someone who once
committed a violent crime is sufficient to warrant their continued incarceration. That person,
after all, is guilty, and should bear the burden as against innocent people. But this is an
unacceptably rigorous standard. Absolute certainty is unattainable in any predictive enterprise.
There are costs to not releasing a person too—not only monetary costs and costs to the offender,
but also in many cases to his family and loved ones and the community from which he comes.
Presumably these latter people are also innocent in the relevant sense. And the requirement of
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certainty could allow us to lock up just about anybody at any time, in the absence of any criminal
behavior whatsoever.
Opponents of LWOP may demand evidence of repentance and change of heart before a
wrongdoer is released, even when the wrongdoer is believe to pose no danger and has been
incarcerated long enough to serve the purpose of general deterrence. This may be the most
plausible view, and I will take it as my starting point.
Nondangerousness and repentance are logically distinct, even though the second often
suggests the first. In other words, one who sincerely regrets and repents of his wrongdoing is
likely to be no longer dangerous. But some of those who commit violence—such as domestic
abusers—may regret their acts even though they may act violently again. And, on the other hand,
ceasing to be dangerous may result from physical or other inability and does not necessarily
reflect repentance.
So here is the view I defend:
Those who commit the worst crimes (and are morally responsible for committing them,
i.e. are not legally insane or otherwise excused from punishment) deserve punishment
and ought to be punished, but those who are no longer dangerous and have undergone a
change of heart amounting to repentance must be evaluated for release after serving a
reasonable and appropriate sentence that satisfies aims of punishment such as deterrence
and respect for law and persons.

VII. Positive arguments for abolishing LWOP
In the remainder of this article I offer positive arguments for abolishing LWOP. Together
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with the arguments already adduced, I believe they add up to an overwhelming case that LWOP
should be abolished.
The considerations that follow divide into three groups. The first focuses on offenders’
culpability and mitigating circumstances. The second concerns the beneficial consequences of
abolishing LWOP and the personal and institutional virtues it reinforces. The third considers the
rationality or lack of it of punishing people who are importantly different from those who
committed the crimes for which we are punishing them.

A. Mitigated responsibility
Even if LWOP is not absolutely wrong, it’s clear that of the nearly 50,000 LWOP
prisoners and the more than 100,000 serving life sentences, many or most of which are de facto
LWOP, the overwhelming majority should eventually be released. Many are serving sentences
that are excessive by any reasonable standard. There are 10,000 lifers convicted of nonviolent
offenses,55 and 10,000 convicted of crimes committed before they were 18 (of whom one in four
is sentenced to LWOP).56 There are many others too who have committed violent crimes but
whose sentences should be tempered because of mental illness, drug addiction, and other
mitigating circumstances.
Most defenders of LWOP are, I believe, talking about a relatively small number of
prisoners who they think should never be released. Why isn’t it enough, then, for LWOP
abolitionists if its defenders concede that most prisoners should have a chance to get out? It
would certainly be an improvement. Compared to the harsh and unjust punishment suffered by
many of these 150,000 prisoners, LWOP for a much smaller number would be major progress.
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The argument for the wholesale abolition of LWOP rests partly on the view that as long
as the sentence offenders endure does not trivialize the gravity of their crime, respect for persons
and their agency means leaving open the possibility that offenders can be morally rehabilitated
and undergo significant change. (I will say more about this shortly.) It may seem laughable to
think that people like Anders Breivik and Dylann Roof (not to mention Hitler and Stalin) might
change, but that’s irrelevant. It’s the principle that if they did they should be considered for
release.
Now of course adamant defenders of LWOP will disagree, asserting that only an
unending life sentence (or death) is appropriate for such people. Either they reject the argument
that the meaning or expressive function of sentences is partly relative, or they simply reassert the
well-worn phrase that LWOP (or death) is what these people deserve.
There is a hint of a paradox in the reasoning of those who defend LWOP for “the worst of
the worst.” It suggests that people like Breivik and Roof are evil through and through. Is it, then,
that such people cannot change, or that they will not? If the latter, so be it; they should remain
locked up. If the former, we come up against grave questions about free will and responsibility
that threaten the very idea of punishment.
I have so far avoided such questions. It may be suspected that many who reject
retributivism as a matter of principle do so partly because they doubt the existence of free will
and thus genuine moral responsibility. Although such concerns are not necessary conditions for
rejecting retributivism, they are, it seems clear, sufficient. You can’t believe people deserve to
suffer unless you think they are morally responsible for the acts that have rendered them
deserving of suffering. The case of psychopaths is instructive. They do not fit the usual criteria
for mental illness or legal insanity, which would excuse them from punishment (although not
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from involuntary incarceration). But how did they “get” the way they are? If they were either
born or made by their environments to have the characteristics that render them indifferent to
others’ suffering, on what moral basis can we punish them? Similar arguments could be made
about wrongdoers who are not psychopaths. Many, perhaps most, of those incarcerated for life
have experienced conditions (whether due to nature or nurture or both) that have contributed to
their committing crimes, such that if they had not experienced these conditions they would not
have committed those crimes. Isn’t that relevant to determining how much punishment they
deserve? But if it is, how do we avoid falling down the slippery slope to the conclusion that no
one is ever morally responsible for their actions and thus no one can ever justly be punished?
Here is one way to avoid the slippery slope. We do it by compromising between two
powerful, intuitive axioms neither of which we can abandon entirely. One is that, practically and
humanly, we must hold people responsible for their actions most of the time. We cannot think of
ourselves or, usually, others as beings whose behavior is the inevitable outcome of everything
that happened to them before. 57 This is the lesson of (or perhaps the reason for) compatibilism,
probably the dominant view of the free will problem among contemporary moral philosophers
and criminal law theorists. Compatibilism says that determinism (universal causation) and free
will or moral responsibility are compatible—that if one’s actions are caused in the right way or
by the right things (and different theories will offer different accounts of what the right way or
the right things are), then we are morally responsible for them; our wills are as free as they need
to be. After all, the compatibilist rightly points out, if our actions were not caused they would be
uncaused, i.e. random, and that would hardly make them free. Although I am as much of a

57

An important and nearly universally acclaimed source of this view is P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48
PROC. BRIT. ACADEMY 1 (1962); reprinted in P. F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS
(2008).

26

compatibilist as the next moral philosopher, the view is satisfying only as long as you don’t push
on it, which we can often avoid doing. But the principle and its upshots clash with another
equally indispensable axiom: the recognition that many of the factors that contribute to a
person’s committing crimes are beyond their control.
Suppose three out of ten people who grow up in environments with certain kinds of
deprivations (high poverty, poor schools, easy access to guns and drugs, non-intact families,
inadequate access to decent employment) go on to commit violent crimes, but only five out of
100 people in the general population commit them. In that case, growing up in the harsher
environment increases one’s chances of criminal behavior six-fold.58 It seems altogether wrong
to ignore such disparities in judging what offenders deserve.
The way to square this circle is to punish, but to punish less harshly than we would if a
more robust conception of free will were in play.59 From a purely logical point of view, this
solution may appear wholly inadequate. It wants to have its cake and eat it too, and must distort
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each of the two principles under consideration. But the compromise, I believe, does as much
justice as we can hope to find in this world.

B. The benefits of abolishing LWOP
Another reason to abolish LWOP and other extremely long sentences is simply that doing
so will likely have good consequences. Consider first the prisoners whose sentences would be
shortened. I shall assume that they would be better off than if they remained incarcerated. That’s
not quite as obvious as it might seem, since formerly incarcerated people can find it very difficult
to secure a decent life on the outside in the absence of education, training, and money, which
they so often lack. Any rational criminal justice system must put provision of these at the center
of its approach. Nonetheless, I assume that even in the absence of such changes formerly
imprisoned people will be better off out of prison than in it. One piece of evidence is that most of
them fervently want to get out.
What about the effects of abolition on society more generally? The waste of human lives
condemned to prison for life, or even for decades, is tragic as well as irrational, and can be
justified only by some powerful offsetting benefits. As we have seen, there is scant evidence that
long sentences have either general or special deterrent value. Incarceration is very expensive, and
becomes more so as prisoners age. 60
Of course, in considering the benefits of LWOP, we cannot ignore the interests of victims
of crime. Some victims want offenders to receive the maximum penalties possible, and may
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otherwise feel unhappy or insecure. But not all victims do; some reject the idea that because one
life has been lost others must be as well.61
But just as important are the families and communities of those who have committed
crimes, who are also victims. The harms of having their members—especially men and,
disproportionately, young black men—disappear from the community for years at a time are
incalculable, even taking account of the benefits of having violent people removed.62 It’s hard to
know how to weigh these harms against any benefits to direct crime victims and their loved ones
of very long sentences. But I doubt that in this comparison the benefits of lengthy sentences,
including LWOP, outweigh its costs.
Also relevant are the benefits to those who adopt a less vindictive approach. If such
policies result from democratic decision-making, that includes “us” as a society, in addition to
individual agents of reintegration. To embrace this approach is to express a certain optimism
about the possibilities of good and redemption in human beings, and those attitudes may benefit
those who hold them.
Ryan Preston-Roedder has explored this terrain in his insightful essay “Faith in
Humanity,” arguing that “having a certain form of faith in people’s decency…is a centrally
important moral virtue.”63 Faith in humanity must not be confused with naïveté; optimism can be

There are many examples, including the families of Dylann Roof’s victims, who forgave perpetrators of violence
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risky. But, as Preston-Roedder notes, all moral virtues carry risks, and it’s possible to exhibit the
virtue while taking the risks responsibly.
Faith in humanity, according to Preston-Roedder, makes the world better both for those
who have faith and for those in whom they have faith. Take first the idea that it is good for those
in whom one has faith. Viktor Frankl, psychotherapist and Auschwitz survivor, proclaimed that
“if we treat people as if they were what they ought to be, we help them become what they are
capable of becoming.”64 It sounds nice, of course. But there is good social-scientific evidence
confirming this view—showing, for example, that people tend to internalize others’ view of
them, and that when people have certain expectations of others’ behavior they may send subtle
signals to which those others then conform. 65 For these and other reasons, “having faith in
people’s decency tends to encourage them to act rightly.” 66 It’s not foolproof; we can make
mistakes, and we can sometimes be taken in by people. Blind trust is not advisable. But an
attitude that does not reduce people to their worst acts, as Bryan Stevenson puts it, and that does
not permanently label them as criminals is more likely to succeed. 67
Is faith in humanity good only because of its presumed effects on those in whom one has
faith? Preston-Roedder argues that it is also a good for those who have faith. Some may think his
reasons beg the question. He believes those with faith in humanity not only will encourage
people to act well but are more likely to treat others justly and to enter “into an important form of
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community with them.”68 Those who support LWOP think that it is just treatment for people who
have committed violent crimes, and they may argue that entering into community with them is
not desirable.
But faith in humanity is good for those who have it even apart from its effects on others.
To be hopeful and optimistic is good for one’s own well-being.69 That alone is not sufficient to
recommend it. But we can count these traits as virtues if we agree that having them is on balance
good for those who possess them and for others. A world in which we do not give up on people
who have done terrible things, and aim to facilitate their journey to a different place, is a better
world than the alternative.

C. Punishment and personal identity
A final reason to abolish LWOP has to do with the strangeness of continuing to punish a
person who committed a crime years earlier, when she may have changed radically. This is the
situation of many people serving extremely long sentences. They may have committed murder
when they were teenagers, and are serving life sentences thirty or forty (or fifty or sixty) years
later. Leaving aside the moral legitimacy of continued punishment, we may question its
rationality. What is the point of punishing a person who recognizes the wrongness of what he has
done, who no longer identifies with those acts, and who bears little resemblance to the person he
was so many years earlier? It’s tempting to say he is no longer the same person.
That judgment might appear to land us into dense philosophical thickets. But is it really
so complicated? To say that the changed convicted felon is in one sense the same person he was
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at seventeen and in another sense not may seem unsatisfying—but it seems pretty accurate, and
conforms to ways we commonly talk. As Jennifer Lackey argues, because we take mental states
to be relevant to punishment, we should also take two stages of the same person “with radically
different attitudes toward his crime, as deserving of different punishments. . . . Current selves
and future selves can vary from one another no less than two altogether distinct people do.” 70
These considerations may seem abstract. For them to become concrete and palpable, it
helps to become acquainted, many years later, with people who have been incarcerated from a
young age. Doing so can cause you to ask whether it makes any sense to continue to punish these
people to the end of their lives. From my experience, the answer is no.

VIII. Conclusions
I have argued that we have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences,
and no good reasons not to. The only rationale for punishment that can hope to justify LWOP is
a retributive one. Even if retributivism is a sound principle, it does not obviously support LWOP.
One reason is that unless one accepts a view like Kant’s that appropriate punishments must be
carried out whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other considerations are
relevant to determining punishments. Thus, even if someone deserves a certain punishment it
does not follow that they should get it; like torturing the torturer or raping the rapist, the
punishment might be too ghastly to be imposed. Furthermore, retributivism does not dictate
particular punishments, so the question remains which ones are reasonable and appropriate.
Tempering sentences need not trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, because
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the expressive meaning of sentences is partly relative—to other sentences and to cultural norms,
which are malleable.
These arguments show that we need not reject retributivism to reject LWOP: justice does
not demand it. But showing why LWOP is wrong also requires making a positive case for
abolition. I have offered several reasons for this conclusion. First, few people are fully culpable
for their criminal acts, and so we should mitigate their punishment accordingly. Second,
abolishing LWOP—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits, to prisoners,
their loved ones, the community, and to those who decide for abolition and who carry it out.
Finally, there is a certain pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone
changes of character that distance him so greatly from the person who committed the crime
many decades earlier.
Life-without-parole sentences should be abolished. But abolition alone will not suffice;
parole must become a more realistic possibility than it is today. That, however, is a subject for
another day.
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